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ABSTRACT 
 
Does Market Learning Explain the Disappearance of the  
Accrual Anomaly? (August 2011) 
Sami Keskek, B.S., Bogazici University; 
M.S., Fatih University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Senyo Y. Tse 
 
This study investigates whether market learning explains the absence of the 
accrual anomaly in recent years by examining three conditions associated with the 
presence of the anomaly in prior research: (i) a differential relation between future 
earnings and cash flows versus accruals, (ii) incorrect weighting of cash flows and 
accruals by investors when predicting earnings, and (iii) association of earnings forecast 
errors with returns.  
All of these conditions are widely documented in the anomaly period.  In the no-
anomaly period, I continue to find a differential relation of cash flows and accruals with 
future earnings.  However, investors appear to correctly weight accruals and cash flows 
in their earnings predictions implicit in beginning-of-year security prices, consistent with 
learning. This study also investigates whether improvements in analyst forecasts 
contribute to investor learning and the absence of the anomaly. The association between 
analyst optimism and accruals is weaker in the no-anomaly period, but is still 
statistically significant. Furthermore, the anomaly ended simultaneously for firms 
 iv 
followed by analysts and for non-followed firms, suggesting that improvements in 
analyst forecasts alone cannot account for improved market efficiency with respect to 
accruals. The results suggest that the anomaly was similar for firms held by institutional 
investors and for firms with no institutional holdings before the discovery of the 
anomaly while the anomaly ended sooner for held firms than for non-held firms after the 
discovery of the anomaly, consistent with the conjecture that arbitrage by institutional 
investors reduce the anomaly. Overall, the findings are consistent with market learning 
and suggest that improvement in investors’ interpretation of accruals after the discovery 
of the anomaly explains the end of the anomaly. This improvement in investor learning 
is not due to changes in analysts’ forecasting behavior, however.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent evidence suggests that investors’ accrual-related mispricing disappeared 
in 2002 and has been undetectable since then (e.g., Richardson et al. 2010 and Green et 
al. 2011). In this study, I investigate whether improvements in investors’ interpretation 
of accruals explain the absence of mispricing in recent years.  I build on Richardson et 
al.’s (2010) conjecture that adaptive market efficiency (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980), or 
market learning, might explain the end of the anomaly.1  Numerous studies suggest that 
analysts are sophisticated information processors and improve market efficiency by 
providing value-relevant information to investors (Elgers et al. 2001; Elgers et al. 2003; 
Gleason and Lee 2003; Ramnath et al. 2008). Other studies suggest, however, that 
analysts also overweight accruals when they issue forecasts, resulting in forecast errors 
that are predictably associated with accruals (e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2001; Ahmed et al. 
2005).  I therefore also examine whether reductions in analysts’ accrual-related bias 
contribute to the end of the anomaly. Efficient use of accounting information is of 
fundamental importance to investors and firms as well as regulators. It is useful to 
document whether market learning can restore efficiency when investors discover that 
the market is inefficient with respect to particular information. Since analysts are 
important information intermediaries and their forecasts exert considerable influence on 
security prices, their possible contribution to market learning is of interest to investors  
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and regulators.    
Sloan (1996) finds that a trading strategy that takes a long position in low-accrual 
firms and a short position in high-accrual firms earns economically large and statistically 
significant hedge returns, a phenomenon referred to as the accrual anomaly. While a 
number of studies argue that the excess returns to the trading strategy can be explained 
by risk-related factors (Khan 2008; Wu et al. 2009), the evidence suggests that the 
excess returns reflect market inefficiency and are driven by investors’ failure to 
anticipate the lower persistence of accruals relative to cash flows (e.g., Collins and 
Hribar 2000; Bradshaw et al. 2001; Xie 2001; Beneish and Vagus 2002; Hirshleifer et al. 
2004; Hirshleifer et al. 2011; Richardson et al. 2010). More generally, the anomaly is 
associated with the following three conditions:  (i) a differential relation between future 
earnings and cash flows versus accruals, (ii) incorrect weighting of accruals by investors, 
leading to earnings forecast errors that are predictably associated with accruals, and (iii) 
association of earnings forecast errors with returns. The recent evidence shows that the 
anomaly disappeared in 2002 (e.g., Richardson et al. 2010). The absence of the anomaly 
provides a unique opportunity to understand the causes of the anomaly. Most 
importantly, the absence of the anomaly implies that at least one of the conditions 
associated with the anomaly changed. Since changes in these conditions lead to distinct 
inferences about trends in the quality and value-relevance of accounting information or 
investor sophistication in interpreting accounting information, it is of fundamental 
importance to understand the contribution of each factor to the absence of the anomaly. 
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Richardson et al. (2010) conjecture that the end of the anomaly could be driven 
by market learning, suggesting that investors learn about the relatively low association of 
accruals with future earnings over time and adjust accordingly. Since the absence of the 
anomaly coincides with the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, 
SOX), it seems plausible that the accounting scandals that led to the enactment of SOX 
and the regulatory changes in SOX may have led investors to pay more attention to the 
implications of cash flows and accruals for future earnings. Other studies suggest that 
the relation between accruals and future earnings changed after the enactment of SOX, 
and that this change, rather than investor learning, may explain the absence of the 
anomaly (e.g., Bhojraj et al. 2009).  For example, Cohen et al. (2008) find a substantial 
decrease in the accruals-based earnings management following SOX. The coincidence of 
the absence of the anomaly with the enactment of SOX also raises the possibility that the 
absence of the anomaly could be due to a loss of investor confidence in the financial 
information provided by firms. If investors rely less on information in earnings, the 
association of earnings forecast errors with returns may be too low to generate excess 
returns.  
Since analysts play an important role as information intermediaries in the capital 
market, improvements in analysts’ forecast properties, or analyst learning, could 
contribute to the absence of the anomaly. Consistent with the view that analysts are 
sophisticated information intermediaries, numerous studies suggest that analysts 
understand the implications of financial information better than investors and improve 
market efficiency by providing value-relevant information to investors (e.g., Brennan et 
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al. 1993; Walther 1997; Bhattacharya 2001; Elgers et al. 2001; Elgers et al. 2003; 
Gleason and Lee 2003). However, prior studies disagree about whether analysts reduce 
or strengthen the accrual anomaly. Bradshaw et al. (2001) document overoptimism in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for high accruals firms and conclude that analysts fail to 
alert investors to the lower association of accruals than cash flows with future earnings.2 
They also conjecture that analysts’ accrual-related optimism could be driven by their 
incentives rather than their inability to interpret accruals. In contrast, Elgers et al. (2003) 
argue that investors could infer the lower persistence of accruals relative to cash flows 
from analyst forecasts but fail to do so. Both studies base their inferences about analysts’ 
contribution to market efficiency with respect to accruals on samples of firms followed 
by analysts. However, the accrual strategy does not require that firms have analysts.  
Unlike prior studies, I provide a direct test of analysts’ role in the accrual anomaly by 
comparing the magnitude and significance of the accrual anomaly for followed and non-
followed firms over the anomaly and no-anomaly periods.  Evidence that the anomaly 
declines more rapidly and ends sooner for followed firms than for non-followed firms 
would support the widely-held notion that analysts contribute to market efficiency.  
 I examine causes of the end of the anomaly using data over 1988-2008. I begin 
by documenting annual excess returns to the accrual-related trading strategy of buying 
firms in the lowest accruals decile and selling firms in the highest decile. The findings 
confirm prior findings that the accrual anomaly disappeared in 2002. I also confirm prior 
evidence that the accrual anomaly does not exist among loss firms (Dopuch et al. 2010) 
                                                 
2
 Bradshaw et al. (2001) do not rule out the possibility that analysts partially see through the subsequent 
accrual reversals. 
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and therefore focus on gain firms in subsequent analyses. Among gain firms, the mean 
excess return to the accrual-related strategy is 18.9 percent during the anomaly period 
whereas it is 0.6 percent and statistically insignificant during the no-anomaly period. I 
next investigate whether a change in the differential persistence of accruals and cash 
flows accounts for the end of the anomaly.  If accruals and cash flows have similar 
relation with future earnings during the no-anomaly period then investors’ naïve fixation 
on earnings would not generate forecast errors that are predictably related to accruals. I 
examine this by regressing future earnings on current year’s accruals and cash flows and 
find that there is a substantial difference in the relation of cash flows versus accruals to 
future earnings in both the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. This implies that the 
accrual anomaly would still exist during the no-anomaly period if investors naively 
assign the same weight to cash flows and accruals when they predict earnings.  
I next employ the Mishkin (1983) test to estimate the weights investors attach to 
the cash flow and accruals earnings components to predict next-period earnings in the 
anomaly and no-anomaly periods. I infer the weights from the relation between the 
earnings components and returns in the one-year period beginning four months after 
earnings are announced.  As in prior studies, I find that investors overweighted accruals 
and underweighted cash flows during the anomaly period. During the no-anomaly 
period, the implicit weights that investors assign to accruals and cash flows are not 
significantly different from the time series association of accruals and cash flows with 
future earnings. Thus, the Mishkin model results suggest that investors learned about the 
differential persistence of accruals and cash flows and incorporated the correct weights 
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in valuing securities in the no-anomaly period. To provide further evidence on this issue, 
I estimate earnings forecast errors from a model based solely on prior-year earnings, the 
naïve model. By construction, this model ignores the lower persistence of accruals than 
cash flows.  Forecast errors from the naïve model are significantly positively associated 
with accruals during both the anomaly and the no-anomaly periods. Next, I partition the 
forecast error from the naïve model into a portion related to accruals and a portion that is 
unrelated to accruals.  I find that size-adjusted returns are significantly associated with 
accrual-related earnings forecast errors in the anomaly period but not in the no-anomaly 
period. This finding suggests that security pricing is consistent with the naïve model in 
the anomaly period but with a model that properly weights cash flows and accruals in the 
no-anomaly period, consistent with learning. I find that investors respond similarly to the 
portion of the earnings forecast error that is unrelated to accruals in the anomaly and no-
anomaly periods. Thus, the end of the anomaly cannot be due to a decline in the value-
relevance of earnings for setting security prices. 
I next investigate whether the correction in investors’ response to cash flows and 
accruals can be attributed to improvements in analyst forecasts. This inference would be 
supported if the anomaly and analysts’ accrual-related optimism end at the same time 
and if the accrual anomaly continues for non-followed firms.  I find a substantial 
decrease in analysts’ accrual related overoptimism that coincides with the end of the 
accrual anomaly, but analysts’ forecasts are still optimistically biased for firms with high 
accruals.  There is no accrual anomaly among followed firms during the no-anomaly 
period. This implies that investors are not influenced by the remaining accrual-related 
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overoptimism in analysts’ forecasts during the no-anomaly period. Consistent with this, I 
find that investors’ response to analysts’ forecast error predictable by a given level of 
accruals is significant during the anomaly period while it is insignificant during the no-
anomaly period. Furthermore, I find that followed and non-followed firms had similar 
levels of the accrual anomaly in the anomaly period and that the anomaly disappeared at 
the same time for both samples. These findings indicate that the end of the anomaly is 
not due to improvements in analyst forecasts, and suggest that analysts’ forecasts did not 
enhance market inefficiency with respect to accruals during the anomaly period.  
To provide evidence on how investors correct accrual-related mispricing, I 
compare excess returns to the accrual strategy for firms held by institutional investors 
and firms with no institutional investor holdings based on the conjecture that arbitrage 
by institutional investors may reduce the anomaly. I focus on institutional investors 
because they may be better positioned than individual investors to trade on knowledge 
about the anomaly. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that returns to the trading 
strategy is similar for firms with moderate and high levels of institutional ownership and 
for firms with no institutional investor ownership in the pre-1996 period, before the 
accrual anomaly was discovered. In the 1996 to 2001 period, when the anomaly became 
widely known and prior studies find continued mispricing, the excess returns to the 
accrual strategy is significantly lower for moderately-held firms than non-held firms and 
is insignificant for high-held firms. I repeat the analyses for mutual fund holdings in 
place of institutional ownership and obtain similar results. Furthermore, I find a 
substantial increase in the percentage of firms held by institutional investors and/or 
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mutual funds, the number of institutions and funds holding stocks a firm, and percentage 
of total shares held by institutions and funds in the no-anomaly period. These findings 
suggest that institutional investors and mutual funds played a significant role in the 
decline of accrual-related mispricing.   
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I extend the 
literature investigating the absence of the anomaly. Green et al. (2011) find an increase 
in both assets managed by hedge funds and trading volume in the extreme accruals 
deciles during the no-anomaly period, and argue that accrual-related trading strategies by 
large hedge funds advised by academic accountants resulted in a decline in the anomaly. 
Mohanram (2009) disputes Green et al.’s (2011) conclusion by showing that the increase 
in trading turnover is not unique to firms with extreme accruals and is driven by small 
trades rather than by the large trades typically made by hedge funds. He argues that 
increases in the number of analysts’ cash flow forecasts explain the recent absence of the 
anomaly. The findings in this study suggest, however, that the absence of mispricing is 
not specific to followed firms, inconsistent with the argument that analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts explain the end of the anomaly. I find the decline in the anomaly started earlier 
for firms held by institutional investors than for firms with no institutional investor 
holdings. I also find increases in both the percentage of firms held by institutional 
investors and the percentage of those firms’ shares held by institutional investors. Thus, 
the findings in this study are more consistent with Green et al. (2011) and suggest that an 
increase in trading to exploit the accrual anomaly by arbitrageurs is likely to explain the 
absence of the anomaly. Second, numerous studies suggest that analysts are 
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sophisticated information processors and enhance market efficiency by providing 
investors with value-relevant information (see Ramnath et al. 2008). Most importantly, 
Elgers et al. (2003) argue that 60 percent of accrual anomaly would be eliminated if 
investors naively fixated on analysts’ forecasts. My results suggest, however, that 
analysts’ forecasts remain inefficient with respect to accruals while investors appear to 
have fully learned about the relation of cash flows and accruals to future earnings. This 
finding is consistent with the conjecture that analysts’ accrual-related bias may arise 
from their incentives to collude with management rather than from their inability to 
process financial information (e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2001). Finally, prior studies view the 
biases in analysts’ forecast as evidence of market wide inefficiency based on the 
assumption that analysts’ forecasts are a reasonable proxy for market expectations (e.g., 
Bradshaw et al. 2001; Bradshaw et al. 2006). Richardson et al. (2010) further argue that 
analyst forecasts could serve as the primary non-priced base test for assessing market 
efficiency with respect to a given value-relevant information item. They suggest that 
finding a relation between analyst forecast errors and a given value-relevant information 
item could be used as an indicator that market is inefficient with respect to that 
information. I find, however, that although analysts’ forecasts continue to be inefficient 
with respect to accruals in the no-anomaly period, this inefficiency is not reflected in 
security prices. The results indicate that investors are not influenced by the remaining 
accrual-related overoptimism in analysts’ forecasts during the no-anomaly period, 
suggesting that market expectations may significantly diverge from analysts’ consensus 
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forecasts. Thus, this study has also implications for studies using analysts’ earnings 
forecasts as a proxy for market expectations.  
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2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Behavioral versus Risk-Based Explanations for Excess Returns to the Accrual 
Strategy  
Sloan (1996) finds that the accruals component of earnings is less persistent than 
the cash flows component. He finds that investors price securities as if they naïvely 
predict next-period earnings using aggregate earnings, ignoring the differential relation 
between future earnings and cash flows versus accruals. As a result, a strategy that takes 
a long position in the lowest-accrual firms and a short position in the highest-accrual 
firms generates economically large and statistically significant excess returns. Following 
Sloan (1996), a large body of literature investigates the robustness of the accrual 
anomaly and searches for the ways to refine it. A number of studies argue that the 
anomaly is illusory and that the excess returns to the trading strategy can be explained by 
risk-related factors (e.g., Khan 2008 and Wu et al. 2009). Most studies conclude, 
however, that the anomaly exists and is driven by investors’ failure to understand the 
lower persistence of accruals than cash flows (e.g., Collins and Hribar 2000; Bradshaw 
et al. 2001; Xie 2001; Beneish and Vagus 2002; Richardson et al. 2010). Other studies 
suggest that the anomaly is real and will endure because of significant economic barriers 
to arbitrage (Lev and Nissim 2006; Mashruwala et al. 2006).  
2.2. The End of the Anomaly and Conditions Associated with the Presence of the 
Anomaly 
Recent studies find that the anomaly disappeared in 2002 and has been 
undetectable since then (e.g., Richardson et al. 2010). The absence of the anomaly in 
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recent years implies that at least one of the following three conditions associated with 
the presence of the anomaly changed:  (i) a differential relation between future earnings 
and cash flows versus accruals, (ii) incorrect weighting of accruals by investors, leading 
to earnings forecast errors that are predictably associated with accruals, and (iii) 
association of earnings forecast errors with returns. Among these alternatives, 
Richardson et al. (2010) conjecture that adaptive market efficiency, or market learning, 
explains the absence of the anomaly. Their conjecture is based on the arguments in 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Lo (2004). Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that it 
is impossible for the markets to always be efficient because information search is costly. 
The level of cost associated with information search may prevent investors from 
discovering new information that is not efficiently incorporated into security prices, 
suggesting that there are some market inefficiencies that are yet to be discovered. 
Richardson et al. (2010) suggest that the research process can improve market efficiency 
by discovering robust relations between accounting information and future stock returns. 
They argue that when investors learn that the market is inefficient with respect to 
particular information, they will eliminate the efficiency over time as they learn to 
incorporate the information into their expectations. This argument is consistent with 
Lo’s (2004) theory of adaptive market efficiency, which suggests that profit 
opportunities will be exploited as they are discovered because investors adapt to changes 
in market conditions. Overall, market learning explanation suggests that when investors 
learn about the accrual related mispricing in the market, they will learn how to 
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efficiently incorporate the information in accruals into their earnings expectations over 
time. 
The market learning explanation presupposes that accruals continue to have 
lower persistence than cash flows in the no-anomaly period, but that investors correctly 
weight cash flows and accruals when predicting earnings in the no-anomaly period. An 
alternative scenario is that the persistence of accruals and cash flows is similar during 
the no-anomaly period, in which case earnings forecasts that ignore the cash flow and 
accruals components of earnings would yield forecast errors that are not associated with 
accruals.  In this scenario, returns would not be associated with accruals even if investors 
naively rely on aggregate earnings when setting security prices. The absence of the 
anomaly could also be driven by a decline in value-relevance of the information in 
earnings rather than market learning or a change in differential persistence of accruals 
and cash flows. That is, the association of earnings forecast errors with returns may be 
too small to generate excess returns even if the differential relation between future 
earnings and cash flows versus accruals persists in the no-anomaly period and investors 
fail to anticipate the lower persistence of accruals than cash flows.   
2.3. Change in Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows for the End of 
the Anomaly 
The end of the accrual anomaly coincides with the enactment of SOX. This is 
particularly important because a number of studies find that firms engaged in less 
accrual-based earnings management once SOX became effective and conclude that the 
quality of accruals is significantly higher in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-
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SOX period. For example, Cohen et al. (2008) find lower absolute discretionary accruals 
following the enactment of SOX. Chambers and Payne (2008) find that persistence of 
accruals is significantly higher in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX period. 
Bhojraj et al. (2009) argue that an increase in the quality of accruals due to lower 
earnings management following the enactment of SOX in 2002 and FAS 146 in 2003 
resulted in a decrease in accrual-related mispricing among restructuring firms. These 
findings suggest that there might be a change in the differential association of accruals 
and cash flows with future earnings after the enactment of SOX. Thus, I first test 
whether a change in the differential persistence of accruals and cash flows rather than 
market learning accounts for the end of the anomaly. If accruals and cash flows have 
similar relation with future earnings during the no-anomaly period then investors’ naïve 
fixation on earnings would not generate forecast errors that are predictably related to 
accruals. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: There is no difference in the persistence of accruals and cash flows in the no-  
anomaly period. 
2.4. Market Learning Explanation for the End of the Anomaly  
If the persistence of accruals and cash flow components of earnings continues to 
differ during the no-anomaly period then the absence of the anomaly could be due to 
either market learning or a decrease in the value-relevance of earnings such that the 
association of earnings forecast errors with returns is too weak to generate excess 
returns. The absence of the anomaly in recent years would be consistent with market 
learning explanation if investors learn to correctly weight accruals and cash flows when 
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incorporating the information in current year earnings into their forecasts of future 
earnings. This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Investors fully anticipate the lower persistence of accruals relative to cash 
flows when forming expectations of future earnings during the no-anomaly 
period. 
2.5. Decline in Value-Relevance of Earnings as an Explanation for the End of the 
Anomaly 
Since the absence of the anomaly coincides with the enactment of SOX, finding 
evidence consistent with market learning would suggest that regulatory changes in SOX 
and associated accounting scandals alerted investors to the differential relation between 
future earnings and cash flows versus accruals and thereby contributed to market 
learning. However, the coincidence of the absence of the anomaly with SOX also raises 
the possibility that investors lost confidence in the financial information provided by 
firms due to the accounting scandals, resulting in the absence of the anomaly. If 
investors rely less on information in earnings, the association of earnings forecast errors 
with returns may be too small to generate excess returns even if investors fail to 
anticipate differential persistence of accruals and cash flows. This leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
H3: There is no association of earnings forecast errors with returns during the no-
anomaly period.  
  
16 
2.6. Analysts’ Contribution to the End of the Anomaly  
Analyst forecasts are an important component of the information set that is 
reflected in security prices. Numerous studies suggest that analysts are sophisticated 
information processors who are more likely than investors to understand the implications 
of financial information for future earnings (e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2001; Elgers et al. 
2003; Chen et al. 2005; Ramnath et al. 2008). Consistent with this, a large body of 
literature concludes that analysts improve market efficiency by providing value-relevant 
information to investors (e.g., Brennan et al. 1993; Walther 1997; Bhattacharya 2001; 
Elgers et al. 2001; Elgers et al. 2003; Gleason and Lee 2003; Ramnath et al. 2008). 
However, prior studies reach conflicting conclusions with respect to analysts’ 
contribution to the accrual anomaly. Some studies find a significant positive association 
between optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts and accruals (Ahmed et al. 2001, 
Bradshaw et al. 2001). Bradshaw et al. (2001) suggest that analysts’ accrual- related 
optimism could be due either to their inability to understand the differential persistence 
of accruals and cash flows or their incentives to collude with managers. Regardless of 
the reason, they conclude that analysts do not alert investors about differential 
persistence of accruals and cash flows. In contrast, Elgers et al. (2003) argue that 
analysts warn investors about future earnings problems associated with high accruals. In 
particular, they find that while both analysts and investors fail to fully anticipate the 
lower persistence of accruals than cash flows and thus overweight the information in 
accruals in their earnings predictions, the overweighting by analysts is less than one third 
of the overweighting by investors. They conclude that returns from the accrual anomaly 
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would be reduced by over 60 percent if investors naively relied on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Kang and Yoo (2007) dispute the Elgers et al. (2003) finding, arguing it is 
induced by omitted variables. Following Liu and Thomas (2000), they control for the 
revision in analysts’ one-year-ahead forecasts and find no significant differences in 
overweighting of the information in accruals by analyst and investors. They conclude 
that analyst forecasts do not help investors understand the lower persistence of accruals, 
a conclusion similar to that reached by Bradshaw et al. (2001).  
The absence of the anomaly in recent years offers a unique opportunity to 
understand analysts’ contribution to the accrual anomaly. Moreover, an important 
feature of prior studies is that they base their inferences solely on samples of firms that 
are followed by analysts. This research design obscures analysts’ contribution to the 
accrual anomaly.  Unlike prior studies, I provide a direct test of analysts’ role in 
increasing or reducing the accrual anomaly by comparing the magnitude and 
significance of the accrual anomaly for followed and non-followed firms over the 
anomaly and no-anomaly periods. Since analysts are sophisticated information 
processors, they are more likely than naïve investors to learn about the lower persistence 
of accruals relative to cash flows. Thus, a reduction in analysts’ accrual-related 
optimism, or analyst learning, could explain the absence of the anomaly. Analyst 
learning as an explanation for the absence of the anomaly would be supported if the 
anomaly and analysts’ accrual-related optimism end at the same time and if the accrual 
anomaly continues for non-followed firms. This leads to the fourth hypothesis: 
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H4a: Analysts’ accrual-related optimism disappears during the no-anomaly 
period. 
H4b: The absence of the accrual anomaly is specific to followed firms during the 
no-anomaly period. 
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1. Sample Selection 
I obtain financial statement data from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged annual 
database, stock returns data from the CRSP monthly stock returns files, and analyst 
forecast data from the IBES detail file. As in prior studies, I exclude financial firms (SIC 
code between 6000 and 6999). I follow Bradshaw et al. (2001) in constructing financial 
variables. In particular, I use Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95 
(SFAS 95) data to measure accruals and cash flows. SFAS data became available in 
fiscal year 1988, and I therefore begin the sample period in fiscal year 1988 and end it in 
fiscal year 2008. In addition, identifying firms followed by analysts is of significant 
importance for the purpose of this study. IBES coverage starts in the late 1970s and data 
are only available for large firms before the late 1980s. Therefore, beginning the sample 
in the late 1980s decreases the possibility of erroneously classifying followed firms as 
having no analyst coverage.  
Following Bradshaw et al. (2001), I use two alternative measures for accruals. 
The first is based on working capital accruals and the second on total net accruals. 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) find that working capital accruals better capture accruals that lead 
to earnings reversals that are unanticipated by investors and report results for this 
measure in their main tests. Following their approach, I only report the results for 
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working capital accruals for conciseness, but find similar results in all my analysis using 
the total net accruals measure.3 I measure working capital accruals as follows: 
WCAcc= Increase in Accounts Receivable (Compustat item RECCH) + Increase in 
inventory (Compustat item INVCH) + Decrease in Accounts Payable and 
Accrued Liabilities (Compustat APALCH) + Decrease in Accrued Income 
Taxes (Compustat item TXACH) + Increase (Decrease) in Assets (Liabilities) -
Other (Compustat item AOLOCH) 
I use earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat 
item OIBDP) as the earnings measure and obtain the corresponding cash flows measure, 
WCCF, by subtracting WCAcc from Compustat item OIBDP. As in prior research, I 
deflate all variables by average total assets (Compustat item AT). Table 1 reports the 
sample selection procedure. The total number of firm-years read from the 
CRSP/Compustat merged file over 1988 and 2008 period is 113,423. The sample with 
non-missing earnings (OIBDP), working capital accruals (WCAcc), and corresponding 
cash flows (WCCF) data consists of 92,988 firm-years.   
Stock returns are obtained from CRSP monthly returns file and are inclusive of 
dividends. I obtain compounded buy-and-hold returns over twelve months beginning 
four months after the end of the fiscal year, and compute size adjusted returns by 
deducting a firm’s size-matched portfolio buy-and-hold return from its raw buy-and-hold 
return. As in Kraft et al. (2006), I obtain size portfolios from CRSP calculations of size  
                                                 
3
 Bradshaw et al. (2001) also find similar results for total net accruals and working capital accruals 
measures. Following Bradshaw et al. (2001), I measure total net accruals as follows: TAcc= Income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat item IBC) - Net Cash Flows from Operating Activities (Compustat item 
OANCF). 
  
21 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
Criteria 
 
Number of Observations 
Remaining 
 
Accounting Information Sample 
All CRSP/Compustat merged firms from 1988 
through 2007  
113,423 
Sample with non-missing Earnings (OIBDP), Cash 
flow (WCCF), and Accruals (WCAcc) data 
92,988 
 
Stock Return Data from CRSP 
 
Firm-years with return data from CRSP 86,619 
Firm-years with Price > 1 78,045 
 
Analyst Forecast Sample 
IBES firm-year sample from 1988 through 2007            100,562 
Observations with return data from CRSP           69,203 
Observations with data to calculate consensus forecast 
within 60 days prior to portfolio formation 
          50,287 
 
 
Combining Accounting Information and Return Sample  
with Analyst Forecast Sample 
Observations with no analyst forecast data over the 
fiscal year 
30,438 
Observations with at least one analyst forecast within 
60 days prior to portfolio formation 
40,017 
Observations with analyst forecasts before portfolio 
formation but no forecast within 60 days prior to 
portfolio formation 
7,590 
 
 
 
deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms. Following their procedures, I set a firm’s return to 
zero for any month in which it is missing (WRDS code “.B”). If a firm is not assigned to 
a size decile by CRSP, I manually determine its size portfolio by using its market 
capitalization as of the beginning of the year. In addition, if a firm is delisted during the 
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return accumulation period, I use the delisting return in the month in which the firm 
delists and assume that the firm’s return is equal to the return of its size-matched 
portfolio for the rest of the year. The delisting return is set to -100% if a firm’s delisting 
return is missing and the delisting is forced by the exchange or Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) or is due to liquidation. Finally, I restrict the sample to firm-year 
observations with fiscal-year-end stock prices greater than one dollar.4 The final number 
of firm–years having financial information and stock returns data is 78,045.5  
My tests require that I identify firms followed by analysts and those with no 
analyst following and measure analysts’ forecast error for followed firms. I obtain 
analyst forecast data from the IBES detail file and adjust analyst forecasts for stock splits 
and stock dividends using the IBES adjustment factors. I find that 30,348 firm-years 
have no analyst forecasts from the announcement of year t earnings to the portfolio 
formation date, and classify these firm-years in the non-followed sample.6 For firms 
followed by analysts, I manually compute the mean consensus forecasts using forecasts 
over the 60-day period ending on the day before the portfolio formation date.7 There are 
                                                 
4
 I exclude these firm-years to mitigate the concern about the underlying cause of the inefficiency driven 
by low priced stocks (Kraft et al. 2006). However, I obtain similar results when I include these firm-years 
in the sample or when I use $5 as the cut-off price. 
5
 Kraft et al. (2006) identify several sample selection biases that affect excess returns to the accrual related 
strategy, and I follow their procedures to mitigate these problems. One sample selection bias they identify 
is selecting stocks based on the current listing exchange instead of the actual exchange for the period 
during which stock returns are measured. Since I use stocks listed in all exchanges, the results do not 
suffer from this selection bias (Kraft et al. 2006).Another sample selection bias identified by Kraft et al. 
(2006) is the exclusion of firms not reporting earnings or accruals in year t+1 from the trading strategy 
sample. I also do not have this sample selection issue. 
6
 Of the firms having no analyst forecasts before the portfolio formation date, 7,793 firm-years have 
analyst forecasts during the year after the portfolio formation date. Eliminating them from no analyst 
following group does not affect the results. 
7
 Following prior studies, I prefer not to use IBES consensus forecast and restrict the forecast age to 60 
days to mitigate the effects of stale forecasts. In addition, analysts’ consensus forecasts may better reflect 
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40,017 firm-years for which I can obtain the mean consensus forecast. Finally, I obtain 
institutional investor holdings from the Thomson Financial Spectrum 13F Institutional 
Holdings Database. 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
I begin by calculating yearly returns to the accrual-related trading strategy of 
buying firms in the lowest-accrual decile and selling firms in the highest-accrual decile 
and plot the returns in Figure 1.  This evidence confirms prior findings that the accrual 
anomaly ended in 2002. I therefore calculate descriptive statistics separately for the 
anomaly period (1988-2001) and the no-anomaly period (2002-2008) and test for 
differences across the two samples. I report the results in Table 2, Panel A.  Firms are on 
average larger and more likely to be followed by analysts during the no-anomaly period. 
I also find that both the percentage of firms held by institutional investors and the 
percentage of those firms’ shares held by institutional investors increased in the no-
anomaly period. Firms are also on average less profitable in the no-anomaly period. In 
the anomaly period, mean asset-deflated earnings are 0.063, and 20 percent of the firms 
report losses. In the no-anomaly period, asset-deflated earnings are 0.048 and 22.1 
percent of the firms report losses.  The differences are statistically significant. The 
decrease in earnings and increase in incidence of losses are consistent with the evidence 
that firms engaged in less accrual-based earnings management to inflate their earnings 
once SOX became effective (Cohen et al. 2008). The distributions of accruals and cash 
flow components of earnings suggest that the decrease in firms’ profitability is driven by 
                                                                                                                                                
the investors’ expectations if the forecast horizon is kept shorter but it results in a decrease in sample of 
firm-years having consensus forecast. 
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FIGURE 1 
 Returns to the Accrual-Related Trading Strategy over Time 
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____________________ 
Figure 1 reports the size adjusted excess return to the accrual strategy for gain firms over time. Firm-year 
observations are ranked annually and assigned in equal numbers to decile portfolios based on WCAcc. The 
accrual strategy buys the firms in the lowest decile and selling firms in the highest decile of accruals. 
 
 
 
a decrease in mean accruals. The mean asset-deflated cash flows are 0.042 and 0.041 in 
the anomaly and no-anomaly periods, respectively, and the difference is insignificant. 
The corresponding numbers for mean asset-deflated working capital accruals are 0.021 
and 0.008 in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods, respectively, and the difference is 
statistically insignificant. In the highest accruals decile, the mean accruals in the 
anomaly period are 0.186 and are significantly larger than the mean accruals in the no-
anomaly period, 0.137. This suggests that the decrease in mean accruals in the no-
anomaly period is due to a decrease in mean accruals of firms in the highest accruals 
decile. This is consistent with prior studies that find a significant decrease in 
discretionary accruals following the enactment of SOX (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008). Thus,  
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables over the Anomaly and No-Anomaly Periods 
 
 
Anomaly Period  
(N=54,269) 
No-Anomaly Period  
(N=23,776) 
Differences 
in Mean 
(t-statistics) 
 Mean 25% Median 75% Mean  25% Median 75%   
Assets 933.589 29.599 101.687 418.945 1,911.73 77.238 285.694 1,157.46 978.14 (29.58) 
Market to Book 3.442 1.232 2.028 3.669 3.359 1.390 2.199 3.718 -0.083 (1.89) 
EARN 0.063 0.035 0.114 0.172 0.048 0.019 0.098 0.156 -0.015 (-9.11) 
WCAcc 0.021 -0.015 0.014 0.056 0.008 -0.019 0.005 0.034 -0.013 (-24.85) 
WCCF 0.042 -0.005 0.091 0.158 0.041 0.001 0.089 0.154 -0.001 (-0.48) 
Loss  0.200 0 0 0 0.221 0 0 0 0.021 (6.61) 
ARET -0.011 -0.418 -0.112 0.203 0.005 -0.312 -0.061 0.192 0.016 (2.95) 
 AnalystFERROR -0.024 -0.023 -0.003 0.002 -0.014 -0.016 -0.001 0.007 0.010 (13.46) 
 AnalystFollow 0.687 0 1 1 0.751 1 1 1 0.064 (17.17) 
Instown 0.240 0.003 0.160 0.412 0.371 0.031 0.334 0.659 0.131 (8.02) 
InstownHeld 0.752 1 1 1 0.807 1 1 1 0.055 (9.25) 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Pearson (Above Diagonal) and Spearman (Below Diagonal) Correlations  
 
 Anomaly Period 
(N = 54,269)  
No-Anomaly Period 
(N = 23,776) 
 EARN  WCCF  WCAcc  EARN  WCCF  WCAcc 
EARN 1  0.909  0.167  1  0.938  0.127 
   <.0001  <.0001    <.0001  <.0001 
WCCF 0.808  1  -0.235  0.873  1  -0.201 
 <.0001    <.0001  <.0001    <.0001 
WCAcc 0.162  -0.331 1  0.106  -0.278 1 
 <.0001  <.0001    <.0001  <.0001   
 
____________________ 
p-values are reported below correlations. 
The number of observations for Market to Book is 52,529 and 23,015 in the anomaly and no-anomaly 
periods respectively. The corresponding sample size for AnalystFERROR is 26,350 and 13,649.  
Assets: Average total assets 
Market to Book: Market value to book value of common. I exclude negative book value observations 
when obtaining Market to Book ratio. 
EARN: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, scaled by average assets (AT). 
WCAcc: Working-capital accruals, calculated as the sum of (appropriately signed) changes in working 
capital accounts from the statement of cash flows (RECCH. INVCH, APALCH, TXACH, AOLOCH), 
scaled by average assets (AT). Missing values for APALCH, TXACH, and AOLOCH are set to zero.  
WCCF: An estimate of cash flows attributable to recurring operations, calculated as the difference 
between EARN and WCAcc, scaled by average assets (AT). 
ARET:  the annual size adjusted buy-and-hold return. The accumulation period begins four months after 
the firm’s fiscal year-end. The size-adjusted returns are calculated by deducting a firm’s size-matched 
portfolio buy-and-hold return from its raw buy-and-hold return, where size portfolios are obtained from 
CRSP and are based on size deciles of NYSE and AMEX firms.   
Loss: Indicator variable taking value of one if the firm incurred loss in prior year, zero otherwise 
AnalystForecast: Analysts’ mean consensus forecast, measured by the average of the most recent forecast 
by each analyst following the firm-year within the 60 days ending one day before the portfolio formation 
date. Analysts’ earnings per share forecasts are adjusted for stock splits, multiplied by outstanding shares, 
and scaled by average total assets. 
EarnIBES: Actual earnings obtained from IBES. IBES actual earnings per share are adjusted for stock 
splits, multiplied by outstanding shares, and scaled by average total assets. 
AFerror: Analysts’ mean consensus forecast error, measured by subtracting EarnIBES from analysts’ 
mean consensus forecast, AnalystForecast. 
AnalystFollow: Indicator variable taking value of one for firm-years having at least one analyst forecast 
prior to the portfolio formation date. 
Instown: Percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
InstownHeld: Indicator variable taking value of one if the firm has institutional investor holdings, and zero 
otherwise. 
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the findings suggest that the persistence of accruals may have increased following SOX, 
and this change may contribute to the end of the anomaly.  
Table 2, Panel A also provides descriptive statistics for analysts’ mean consensus 
forecast error, AnalystFERROR. The mean (median) consensus forecast errors are -0.024 
(-0.003) and -0.013 (-0.0004) in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods respectively and 
untabulated results show that the difference in means is statistically significant. This is 
consistent with prior findings suggesting that optimism in analysts’ consensus forecasts 
early in the year decreased in recent years (Hovakimian and Seanyasiri 2010). In Table 
2, Panel B, I report the correlations for earnings, accruals, and cash flows separately for 
anomaly and no-anomaly periods. Consistent with prior research, accruals are positively 
correlated with earnings and negatively correlated with cash flows. The correlation 
coefficients are similar in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods.  
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4. RESEARCH METHODS, SPECIFICATION OF EMPIRICAL 
TESTS, AND RESULTS 
4.1. Accrual Anomaly over Time 
In this section, I first document the excess return to the accrual related strategy of 
buying firms in the lowest and selling firms in the highest accruals deciles. Figure 1 
confirms prior evidence that the accrual anomaly disappeared in 2002. Therefore, I 
separately examine the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. Hayn (1995) shows that 
security prices are insensitive to losses, and argues that this is because of equity 
investors’ liquidation option. This suggests that one of the conditions required for the 
presence of the accrual anomaly, namely the association between earnings and returns, is 
weak or missing for loss firms. Consistent with this, Dopuch et al. (2010) find that there 
is no anomaly among loss firms. Therefore, I report the excess return to the accrual 
strategy for the full sample as well as separately for gain firms and loss firms. 
Table 3, Panel A reports the excess return to the accrual strategy in the anomaly 
period. For the full sample, the excess return to the accrual strategy is about 10.7 percent 
per year. Consistent with Kraft et al. (2006), I find that the accrual anomaly is mainly 
driven by negative excess return to the firms in the highest accruals decile. The excess 
return to the firms in the lowest accruals decile is small and statistically insignificant 
whereas it is larger and significantly positive for the firms in the second decile of 
accruals. Thus, the results for the full sample suggest an inverted U-shaped relation 
between accruals and future stock returns as in Kraft et al. (2006). An inverted U-shaped 
relation is inconsistent with Sloan (1996)’s earnings fixation hypothesis that the accrual  
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TABLE 3 
Excess Return to the Accrual Strategy 
 
 
 Panel A: Anomaly Period  
(1988-2001) 
 Panel B: No-Anomaly Period  
(2002-2008) 
Accruals 
Decile 
 Full 
Sample 
 Gain 
Firms 
 Loss 
Firms 
 Full 
Sample 
 Gain 
Firms 
 Loss 
Firms 
Low  0.015  0.088  -0.124  -0.039  0.005  -0.056 
Decile 2  0.039  0.059  -0.065  0.002  0.016  -0.079 
Decile 3  0.020  0.036  -0.025  0.007  0.015  -0.032 
Decile 4  -0.002  0.019  -0.102  0.008  0.009  -0.007 
Decile 5  0.007  0.022  -0.062  0.048  0.017  -0.077 
Decile 6  -0.018  -0.004  -0.125  0.031  0.046  0.004 
Decile 7  -0.003  0.003  -0.039  0.021  0.020  -0.035 
Decile 8  -0.023  -0.024  -0.063  0.024  0.036  -0.046 
Decile 9  -0.049  -0.032  -0.096  -0.002  0.015  0.025 
High  -0.092  -0.101  -0.074  -0.008  -0.001  -0.113 
Low-High  0.107
***
 
(3.51) 
 0.189*** 
(7.75) 
 -0.050 
(-0.93) 
 -0.031 
(-0.93) 
 0.006 
(0.16) 
 0.057 
(0.69) 
N  54,269  43,399  10,870  23,776  18,512  5,264 
 
___________________ 
*, **, and *** refers to significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
This table reports the size adjusted excess return to the accrual strategy separately for the full sample, gain 
firms, and loss firms over the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. Firm-year observations are ranked 
separately for each subsample each year and assigned in equal numbers to decile portfolios based on 
WCAcc. The accrual strategy buys the firms in the lowest decile and selling firms in the highest decile of 
accruals. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
anomaly is driven by investors’ failure to anticipate lower persistence of accruals with 
respect to cash flows. I find that the inverted U-shaped relation is induced by loss firms, 
and that the mean excess return to the accrual strategy increases to 18.9 percent per year 
when I exclude loss firms from the sample. This change is almost entirely due to the 
lowest accrual decile, which has insignificant excess returns when loss firms are in the 
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sample but has statistically significant mean excess returns of 8.8 percent per year when 
loss firms are excluded from the sample.8 Unlike the results for the full sample, the 
future stock returns decline monotonically from lowest- to highest-accrual portfolios. 
Because loss firms distort returns to the accrual strategy, I focus on gain firms in 
subsequent analyses.  
Table 3, Panel B reports the excess returns to the accrual strategy over the no-
anomaly period. Among gain firms, the average excess return to the accrual strategy is 
0.6 percent over 2002-2007. Figure 1 shows the excess return to the accrual strategy for 
gain firms over time. The results confirm prior findings that the accrual strategy does not 
earn significant excess returns after 2001.  
4.2. Persistence of Accruals in the Anomaly and No-Anomaly Periods 
In this section, I test whether a change in the differential relation between future 
earnings and cash flows versus accruals explains the absence of the anomaly in recent 
years. I examine this by regressing next year’s realized earnings on the accruals and cash 
flows components of this year’s earnings:9   
12101 ++ +++= tttt uWCCFWCAccEARN γγγ .                                           (1) 
I estimate the model on a year-by-year basis for 1988-2008 and report Fama 
MacBeth coefficients and corresponding t-statistics separately for the anomaly and no-
anomaly periods in Table 4. I find that the coefficient on accruals increases from 0.635  
                                                 
8
 These findings suggest that having loss firms in the accrual strategy is likely to influence the inferences 
with respect to causes of the accrual anomaly in prior studies. For example, motivated by the evidence that 
the anomaly is mainly driven by the negative excess return to firms with high accruals, Kothari et al. 
(2005) argue that agency theory of overvalued equity rather than investors’ failure to anticipate lower 
persistence of accruals explains the anomaly.  
9
 Requiring firms to have next year’s earnings reduces the sample from 43,378 to 41,028 and from 16,085 
to 15,254 in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods, respectively.  
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TABLE 4 
The Relation of Accrual and Cash Flow Components of Income with Next-Period 
Earnings 
 
      12101 ++ +++= tttt uWCCFWCAccEARN γγγ                                            (1) 
 
Coefficient 
 
Anomaly Period 
 
No-Anomaly  
Period 
 Difference: 
Anomaly – 
No-anomaly 
 
0γ   0.012 (6.72) 
 0.013 
(5.42) 
  
1γ   0.635 (39.86) 
 0.700 
(30.32) 
 -0.065** 
(-2.37) 
2γ   0.813 (88.63) 
 0.842 
(89.94) 
 -0.029* 
(-1.98) 
       
Test:  
1-  2= 0 
 -0.178*** 
(-10.67) 
 -0.142*** 
(-7.28) 
 -0.036 
(-1.35) 
N  41,028  17,171   
Adj. R2  0.343  0.452   
 
___________________________ 
*, **, and *** refers to significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
This table reports the results for the persistence of the accruals and cash flows components of earnings for 
gain firms. The model is estimated in each year separately. I report Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates 
and corresponding t-statistics. Each annual coefficient estimate is treated as a single observation and 
statistical tests of differences are based upon the means and standard deviations of the annual observations.  
The difference column shows whether the coefficient on the accruals and cash flow component of earnings 
significantly difference from the mean coefficient on accruals and cash flows during the no-anomaly 
period.  
EARN: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, scaled by average assets (AT). 
WCAcc: Working-capital accruals, calculated as the sum of (appropriately signed) changes in working 
capital accounts from the statement of cash flows (RECCH. INVCH, APALCH, TXACH, AOLOCH), 
scaled by average assets (AT). Missing values for APALCH, TXACH, and AOLOCH are set to zero.  
WCCF: An estimate of cash flows attributable to recurring operations, calculated as the difference 
between EARN and WCAcc, scaled by average assets (AT). 
 
 
 
in the anomaly period to 0.700 in the no-anomaly period and the increase is statistically 
significant. There is also a significant increase in the persistence of cash flows in the no-
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anomaly period. I find that the coefficient on accruals is significantly smaller than the 
coefficient on cash flows in both the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. Furthermore, the 
gap between the persistence of cash flows and accruals is 0.178 and 0.142 in the 
anomaly and no-anomaly periods respectively, and the change in the gap is not 
statistically significant. Overall, although there is an increase in the persistence of 
accruals in the no-anomaly, the differential relation between future earnings and cash 
flows versus accruals persists in that period. This suggests that a decrease in the 
differential persistence of accruals and cash flows cannot explain the absence of the 
anomaly in the no-anomaly period.  
4.3. Investors’ Pricing of Accruals and Cash Flows in the Anomaly and No-Anomaly 
Periods 
In this section, I use the Mishkin model to measure changes in investors’ pricing 
of accruals and cash flows components of earning in the no-anomaly period. This 
procedure allows me to infer the weights that investors assign to accruals and cash flows 
in predicting next-period earnings and the consistency of those weights with their 
empirical relation with earnings in equation 1.  Since accruals continue to be less 
persistent than cash flows in the no-anomaly period, finding that investors correctly 
weight accruals and cash flows would support the market learning explanation for the 
absence of the anomaly. To examine this, I simultaneously estimate the following 
forecasting and pricing models:  
Forecasting Model: 
12101 ++ +++= tttt uWCCFWCAccEARN γγγ .                                           (1) 
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and  
Pricing Model: 
1
*
2
*
11001 )( +++ +−−+= ttttt WCCFWCAccEARNARET νγγββ .                     (2) 
I estimate the models on a year-by-year basis for 1988-2008.10 Table 5 reports 
Fama MacBeth coefficients and corresponding t-statistics separately for the anomaly and 
no-anomaly periods. Market efficiency with respect to the accruals component of 
earnings requires that 1γ = *1γ . As in prior studies, the results for the anomaly period 
show that *1γ is significantly larger than 1γ  while *2γ is significantly smaller than 2γ .  This 
implies that investors overweight the information in accruals and underweight the 
information in cash flows when forming expectations of future earnings.  
In the no-anomaly period, I find that that *1γ is not significantly different than 1γ  
and that *2γ is not significantly different than 2γ , suggesting that investors correctly 
weight the information in accruals and cash flows when setting security prices. The 
results so far show that the differential association of future earnings with accruals 
versus cash flows persists in the no-anomaly period.  However, investors correctly price 
the components of earnings by lowering the weight that they assign to accruals and 
increasing the weight that they assign to cash flows. The findings are consistent with 
market learning explanation for the absence of the anomaly, suggesting that investors 
learned about the differential persistence of accruals and cash flows and eventually 
incorporated the correct weights in valuing securities. Furthermore, I find that the return  
                                                 
10
 The results and inferences are similar when I estimate the model over separate pooled samples in the 
anomaly and no-anomaly periods. 
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TABLE 5 
Investors’ Pricing of Accruals and Cash Flows over the Anomaly and No-Anomaly 
Periods  
 
12101 ++ +++= tttt uWCCFWCAccEARN γγγ                                                        (1) 
 1
*
2
*
11101 )( +++ +−−+= ttttt WCCFWCAccEARNARET νγγββ                              (2) 
 
 
 Anomaly Period 
(N=41,028)  
No-Anomaly Period 
(N=17,171) 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics 
0γ   0.012  6.63  0.013  5.43 
1γ   0.639  36.02  0.703  29.35 
*
1γ   0.912  8.45  0.684  9.40 
2γ   0.813  80.77  0.841  89.99 
*
2γ   0.625  13.28  0.811  6.75 
0β   0.025  4.24  0.027  1.08 
1β   1.721  17.99  1.830  9.28 
Test: 1γ - *1γ = 0  -0.273***  -3.15  0.019  0.25 
Test: 2γ - *2γ = 0  0.188***  4.03  0.030  0.65 
___________________________ 
*, **, and *** refers to significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The 
sample is restricted to gain firms. This table reports the results for investors’ pricing of the accruals and 
cash flows components of earnings. The model is estimated in each year separately. I report Fama-
MacBeth coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics. Each annual coefficient estimate is treated as 
a single observation and statistical tests of differences are based upon the means and standard deviations of 
the annual observations.  Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
 
 
response coefficient, 1β , is statistically similar in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. 
Thus, I fail reject the hypothesis that there is no association of earnings forecast errors 
with returns during the no-anomaly period. This suggests that a loss of investor 
confidence in the financial information provided by firms is not likely to explain the 
absence of the anomaly.  
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4.4. Investors’ Response to Earnings Forecast Errors that are Predictable versus 
Unpredictable from Accruals  
I provide further evidence on market learning by studying investors’ response to 
earnings forecasts errors predictable by a given level of accruals in the anomaly and no-
anomaly periods. Sloan (1996) argues that investors naively rely on aggregate earnings 
and ignore the lower persistence of accruals than cash flows when forming expectations 
of future earnings. Following Sloan (1996), I estimate earnings forecast errors from a 
model based solely on prior-year earnings, the naïve model:  
1101 ++ ++= ttt uEARNEARN γγ
.                                                                        (3) 
The results, reported in Table 6, Panel A, suggest that the relation between future 
earnings and current earnings is similar in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. The 
coefficient on current earnings is 0.752 in the anomaly period and 0.756 in the no-
anomaly period.  The residuals from Model (3), 1+tu , represent the earnings forecast 
errors from the naïve model, NaiveFerror. Because the naive model ignores the lower 
persistence of accruals than cash flows, forecast errors from this model will be positively 
associated with accruals. I regress earnings forecast errors, NaiveFerror, on current year 
accruals to obtain the component of earnings forecast errors predictable by a given level 
of accruals. In particular, I estimate the following model: 
1101 ++ ++= ttt eWCAccrNaiveFerro αα .                                                             (4) 
The results are reported in Table 6, Panel B, and suggest that earnings forecast 
errors are significantly positively associated with current-year accruals in the anomaly 
and no-anomaly periods, consistent with the findings that accruals are less persistent 
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TABLE 6 
Testing the Implications of Investors’ Naïve Fixation on Earnings 
 
Panel A: Naïve Fixation Model 
 
1101 ++ ++= ttt uEARNEARN γγ .                                                                           (3) 
 
  
 Anomaly Period 
(N=41,028) 
 No-Anomaly Period 
(N=17,171) 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics 
0γ   0.021  6.31  0.021  11.63 
1γ   0.752  61.34  0.756  57.45 
Adj. R2  0.318    0.420   
 
 
Panel B: Accrual Related Bias in Forecasts from the Naïve Fixation Model 
 
1101 ++ ++= ttt eWCAccrNaiveFerro αα .                                                                (4) 
 
 
 Anomaly Period 
(N=41,028) 
 No-Anomaly Period 
(N=17,171) 
 Difference 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics   
0α   0.006  16.71  0.003  5.97   
1α  
 
-0.166  -13.35  -0.124  -4.78  -0.042 (-2.15) 
Adj. R2  0.024    0.013     
 
 
Panel C: Market Response to Predictable and Unpredictable NaiveFerror 
 
1121101 ++++ +++= tttt eFerrorUnpredNaivrrorredNaiveFePARET εδδδ .    (5) 
 
 
 Anomaly Period 
(N=41,028) 
 No-Anomaly Period 
(N=17,171) 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics 
0δ   -0.008  -0.80  0.014  0.70 
1δ   4.102  11.22  0.780  0.85 
2δ   1.956  12.39  2.089  7.00 
Adj. R2  0.077    0.067   
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
___________________________ 
*, **, and *** refers to significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
This table reports the results for the accrual related optimism in forecasts from the naïve earnings fixation 
model and tests whether the naïve fixation is consistent with investors’ pricing of the accruals and cash 
flows components of earnings. The models are estimated in each year separately. I report Fama-MacBeth 
coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics. Each annual coefficient estimate is treated as a single 
observation and statistical tests of differences are based upon the means and standard deviations of the 
annual observations. NaiveFerror is equal to residual from the model (3) and winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. PredNaiveError is the component of NaiveError that is predictable by a given level of 
accruals. It is equal to the predicted part of NaïveError in Model (4).  UnpredNaiveError is the component 
of NaiveError that is not predictable by a given level of accruals. It is equal to the residuals from Model 
(4). See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
than cash flows in both periods. This implies that the accrual anomaly would still exist 
during the no-anomaly period if investors naively assigned the same weight to cash 
flows and accruals when they predict earnings. I next examine investors’ response to the 
components of NaïveFerror that are predictable versus unpredictable using accruals. The 
predicted part of NaïveFerror in Model (4), PredNaiveFerror, is the fitted value using 
accruals.  The residuals from Model (4) are the unpredictable component of earnings 
forecast errors, UnpredNaiveFerror. Market learning would suggest that investors stop 
responding to predictable earnings forecast errors while they respond similarly to 
unpredictable errors in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. To examine this, I estimate 
the following model:  
1121101 ++++ +++= tttt eFerrorUnpredNaiverrorPredNaiveFARET εδδδ .             (5) 
The results, reported in Table 6, Panel C, suggest that investors responded 
strongly to earnings forecast errors predictable by a given level of accruals during the 
anomaly period while their response is insignificant during the no-anomaly period. In 
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particular, the coefficient on PredNaiveFerror in the anomaly period is 4.102 and is 
statistically significant.  The corresponding coefficient in the no-anomaly period is 0.780 
and is insignificant. Thus, I find that investors’ response to the information in earnings is 
consistent with the naïve model in the anomaly period but is consistent with a model that 
properly weights cash flows and accruals in the no-anomaly period.  The results further 
support the market learning explanation for the end of the anomaly. Furthermore, I find 
that investors respond similarly to the unpredictable component of earnings forecast 
errors, UnpredNaiveFerror, in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. This indicates that 
returns respond to earnings forecast errors in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods, and 
is consistent with the results from the Mishkin model.  The findings suggest that the end 
of the anomaly is not due to a decline in the value-relevance of earnings for setting 
security prices. 
4.5. Analysts’ Contribution to the End of the Anomaly 
In this section, I examine whether a reduction in accrual-related bias in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, or analyst learning, explains the absence of the anomaly in recent 
years. If analyst forecasts are the cause of improved market efficiency then analysts’ 
accrual-related optimism should disappear at the same time as the anomaly.  
Furthermore, the anomaly should only end for followed firms. To examine this, I first 
regress analysts’ mean consensus forecast error on accruals. That is, I estimate the 
following model: 
1101 ++ ++= ttt eWCAccAFerror αα .                                                                   (6) 
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I estimate the model on a year-by-year basis for 1988-2008. Table 7, Panel A 
reports Fama MacBeth coefficients and the corresponding t-statistics separately for the 
anomaly and no-anomaly periods. The mean coefficients on accruals are -0.134 and -
0.082 in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods respectively, and both coefficients are 
statistically significant, indicating that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistically 
biased for firms with high accruals in both periods.  The difference in the coefficients is 
statistically significant, suggesting a significant decrease in analysts’ accrual-related 
overoptimism in the no-anomaly period. The findings suggest that the anomaly would 
still exist if investors naively fixated on analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. I 
examine this question by regressing returns on the component of analysts’ forecast errors 
that is predictable based on accruals and the unpredictable portion. I estimate the 
following model: 
1121101 ++++ +++= tttt rorUnpredAFerrPredAFerroARET εδδδ ,                          (7) 
where 
PredAFerror is the component of AFerror predicted by accruals in Model (6), 
equal to the fitted values from Model (6), and  
UnpredAFerror is the component of AFerror that is not predictable by accruals, 
equal to the residuals from Model (6).  
The results, reported in Table 7, Panel B, suggest that investors strongly 
responded to analysts’ earnings forecast errors predictable by a given level of accruals 
during the anomaly period while their response is insignificant during the no-anomaly 
period. In particular, the coefficient on PredAFerror is 5.568 and statistically significant 
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TABLE 7 
Analysts’ Forecast Inefficiency with Respect to Accruals and Market Reaction to 
Predictable Bias in Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
Panel A: Analysts’ Accrual Related Optimism  
 
1101 ++ ++= ttt eWCAccAFerror αα .                                                                               (6) 
                                                               
 
 Anomaly Period 
(N=23,516) 
 No-Anomaly Period 
(N=11,319) 
 Difference 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics   
0α   -0.014  -25.79  -0.008  -5.15   
1α  
 
-0.134  -16.35  -0.082  -5.73  -0.052 (-6.33) 
Adj. R2  0.035    0.013     
 
  
 
Panel B: Investors’ Response to Predictable and Unpredictable Components of 
Analysts’ Forecast Error 
 
1121101 ++++ +++= tttt rorUnpredAFerrPredAFerroARET εδδδ .                           (7) 
             
 
 Anomaly Period 
(N=23,516) 
 No-Anomaly Period 
(N=11,319) 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics 
0δ   0.110  6.94  0.014  1.11 
1δ   5.568  7.73  0.710  1.18 
2δ   3.598  18.84  3.471  14.28 
Adj. R2  0.098    0.099   
 
___________________ 
This table reports the results for the accrual related optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts and tests 
whether investors anticipate analysts’ accrual related optimism. The models are estimated in each year 
separately. I report Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics. Each annual 
coefficient estimate is treated as a single observation and statistical tests of differences are based upon the 
means and standard deviations of the annual observations. AFerror is obtained by subtracting analysts’ 
mean earnings forecasts from the actual earnings and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
PredAFerror is the component of AFerror that can be predictable by using accruals. It is equal to predicted 
part of AFerror from Model (6). UnpredAFerror is the component of AFerror that is not predictable by 
accruals. It is equal to the residuals from Model (6). See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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in the anomaly period while it is 0.710 and insignificant in the no-anomaly period.  
Thus, I find that investors are not influenced by the remaining accrual-related 
overoptimism in analysts’ forecasts during the no-anomaly period. These results suggest 
that market expectations may significantly diverge from analysts’ consensus forecasts. 
The evidence that analysts continue to issue optimistically biased forecasts for firms 
with high accruals while investors appear to fully learn about the lower persistence of 
accruals than cash flows is consistent with the conjecture that analysts’ accrual-related 
bias could be intentional (e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2001). The results in this study suggest, 
however, that investors also learn about the biases in analysts’ forecasts and adjust 
accordingly. I find that investors respond similarly to the unpredictable component of 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors, UnpredAFerror, in the anomaly and no-anomaly 
periods. Similar to the results in the Miskin model analysis and the analysis of 
unpredictable from the naïve forecast model, this suggests that the decrease in investors’ 
response to predicted component of analysts’ forecast errors is not attributable to a 
decline in value-relevance of analysts’ forecasts. 
The results so far suggest that reduction in accrual-related bias in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts cannot explain the absence of the anomaly in recent years. I provide 
further evidence on analysts’ role in the market inefficiency with respect to accruals by 
comparing the magnitude and significance of the accrual anomaly for followed and non-
followed firms in the anomaly and no-anomaly periods. I classify the anomaly period 
into two sub-periods, 1988-1996 and 1996-2001, based on the publication date of Sloan 
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(1996).11 I conduct this analysis to determine whether investors appear to have started 
learning about the anomaly when the accrual anomaly became widely known. 
Furthermore, if analysts contributed to market learning about the anomaly, the decline in 
the anomaly would be more rapid and end sooner for followed firms than for non-
followed firms.  Table 8 reports the excess returns to the accrual strategy for the full 
sample as well as separately for followed and non-followed firms in each sub-period. 
From 1988 and 1995, prior to publication of Sloan (1996), the mean excess returns to the 
accrual strategy are 17.1 percent and 16.8 percent per year for followed and non-  
 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Excess Returns to the Accrual Strategy by Analyst Following over Sub-Periods 
 
Period 
 Full Sample 
N=61,890 
 Followed 
N=34,874 
 Non-Followed 
N=20,903 
 Difference: 
Followed Minus 
Non-Followed 
1988-1995  0.164 (5.68) 
 0.171 
(4.97) 
 0.168 
(4.01) 
 0.003 
(0.02) 
1996-2001  0.226 (6.51) 
 0.217 
(4.44) 
 0.244 
(3.44) 
 -0.027 
(-0.46) 
2002-2008  0.005 (0.16) 
 -0.021 
(-0.62) 
 0.020 
(0.21) 
 -0.041 
(-0.72) 
 
___________________ 
This table reports the size adjusted excess return to the accrual strategy for pre-Sloan period, 1988-1995, 
after Sloan and anomaly period, 1996-2001, and no-anomaly period, 2002-2008. Firm-year observations 
are ranked annually and assigned in equal numbers to decile portfolios based on WCAcc. The excess 
return to the accrual strategy of buying firms in the lowest accruals decile and selling firms in the hightest 
accruals decile is obtained in each year. Each annual excess return is treated as a single observation and 
statistical tests of differences are based upon the means and standard deviations of the annual observations. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Followed firms do not include firms if forecast age is over 60 days 
prior to the portfolio formation date. The results are very similar when I consider them as followed firms. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
                                                 
11
 Green et al. (2009) use a similar classification. 
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followed firms respectively. The corresponding mean excess returns are 21.7 percent and 
24.4 percent between the years 1996 and 2001. Thus, the accrual strategy does not 
generate significant excess return in the no-anomaly period for either followed or non-
followed firms.  
In Table 9, I formally test the differences in the accrual anomaly for followed and 
for non-followed firms by estimating a model that includes numerous control variables 
to account for differences across followed and non-followed firms. I estimate the 
following model: 
)8(
*
1765
4321101
+
+
++++
+++++=
tttt
ttttt
BetaEPINSTOWN
LMBLMVDWCAccFollowDWCAccFollowARET
νβββ
ββββαα
 
where Follow is an indicator variable taking value of one for firm-years having at 
least one analyst forecast prior to the portfolio formation date. 
I find that the coefficient on DWCAcc is -0.128 in the 1988-1995 subperiod and -
0.178 in the 1996-2001 subperiod, both statistically significant. Consistent with the 
portfolio results, the coefficient on DWAcc is 0.019 and insignificant in the no-anomaly 
period, suggesting that there is no association between returns and the level of accruals 
in this period. I find that the coefficient on the interaction term, DWCAccFollow* , is 
insignificant in each sub-period, suggesting that the association between returns and 
accruals is similar for followed and non-followed firms in each sub-period. Overall, both 
portfolio and regression results suggest that the absence of the anomaly is not due to 
improvements in analyst forecasts, and suggest further that analysts’ forecasts did not 
enhance market inefficiency with respect to accruals during the anomaly period. 
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TABLE 9 
Testing the Difference in the Accrual Anomaly for Followed and Non-Followed 
Firms 
 
.
*
1765
4321101
+
+
++++
+++++=
tttt
ttttt
BetaEPINSTOWN
LMBLMVDWCAccFollowDWCAccFollowARET
νβββ
ββββαα
    (8) 
 
Variable 
Anomaly 
Sub-Period: 
(1988-1995) 
Anomaly 
Sub-Period: 
(1996-2001) 
No-Anomaly 
Period: 
(2002-2008) 
Intercept 0.091 
(3.50) 
0.055 
(1.73) 
-0.028 
(-1.06) 
Follow 0.012 
(1.24) 
0.033 
(2.35) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
DWCAcc -0.128 
(-5.05) 
-0.176 
(-4.81) 
0.019 
(0.62) 
Follow*DWCAcc -0.009 
(-0.28) 
0.012 
(0.29) 
-0.006 
(-0.17) 
LMV -0.013 
(-3.73) 
-0.007 
(-1.89) 
0.004 
(1.29) 
MB -0.007 
(-0.83) 
-0.030 
(-2.78) 
-0.021 
(-2.54) 
INSTOWN -0.004 
(-0.20) 
0.025 
(1.06) 
-0.006 
(-0.53) 
EP 0.071 
(1.49) 
0.150 
(2.17) 
0.201 
(3.41) 
Beta 0.028 
(3.06) 
0.029 
(1.98) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
Adj. R2 0.007 0.009 0.006 
N 18,613 17,948 15,721 
 
___________________ 
This table reports the results obtained from OLS regressions of size-adjusted returns on scaled decile 
rankings of WCAcc and control variables over different sub-periods.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm and year level. t-statistics are  reported in parentheses. DWCAcc is scaled decile rankings of WCAcc. 
Accruals are ranked in each year and sorted into decile portfolios and scaled to range between zero and 
one. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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4.6. Institutional Investors and Learning 
To provide further evidence on how investors correct accrual-related mispricing, 
I examine the differences in the excess returns to the accrual strategy between firms held 
by institutional investors and firms with no institutional investor holdings. Prior studies 
consider institutional investors to be sophisticated market participants who understand 
the differential association of future earnings with cash flows versus accruals better than 
individual investors (e.g., Ali et al. 2000; Collins et al. 2003).  Since institutional 
investors have greater resources for collecting and processing information, they are also 
less likely than individual investors to be influenced by accrual-related bias in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. In addition, a significant part of the anomaly lies on the short side. 
Thus, even if individual investors know about the accrual anomaly, they may be unable 
to act on this knowledge. This suggests that the accrual-related mispricing could be 
better corrected by the actions of arbitrageurs, i.e., institutional investors. If institutional 
investors played a significant role in removing accruals mispricing then the excess 
returns to the accrual strategy should be lower for firms held by institutional investors 
than firms with no institutional investor holdings once the anomaly became widely 
known. I examine this possibility by comparing the magnitude and significance of the 
accrual anomaly for firms held by institutional investors (Held firms) and firms with no 
institutional holdings (Non-Held firms) over each sub-period as defined before. Prior 
studies suggest that dedicated institutions follow passive investment strategies and are 
therefore unlikely to trade on information in the accruals signal (e.g., Collins et al. 
2003). Therefore, I further classify Held firms based on holdings by dedicated and 
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transient institutional investors. Institutions are labeled as dedicated if they hold at least 
one percent of shares of a firm-year. I label firm-years as High-IH (high institutional 
holding) if the percentage of shares held by transient institutions is at least 15 percent of 
shares of a firm-year and percentage of shares held by dedicated institutions is not in the 
upper quartile of the dedicated institutional investor holdings distribution and as 
Moderate-IH otherwise.12  
In Table 10, I formally examine whether the accrual anomaly differs by investor 
sophistication by estimating a model of accrual-related returns in three periods—the pre-
1996 period, before the accrual anomaly was discovered, 1996 to 2001, where prior 
studies find continued mispricing, and 2002 to 2008, where the accrual strategy earns 
insignificant returns.  I include numerous control variables used in prior studies in my 
model (e.g., Collins et al. 2003). The model is: 
)9(.
**
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The regression results, reported in Table 10, suggest that the anomaly is similar 
for Non-Held, Moderate-IH, and High-IH firms before the discovery of the anomaly, 
between 1988 and 1995. The coefficient on the scaled decile accrual rankings is -0.146, 
indicating a mean excess return to the accrual strategy of 14.6 percent for Non-Held 
firms in this period. I find that the mean excess returns to Non-Held and Moderate-IH 
firms are around 27.9 percent and 18.5 percent per year in the 1996 and 2001 period,  
                                                 
12
 I obtain similar results when I classify held firms into Moderate-IH and High-IH groups based on the 
number of transient institutions or all institutions holding stocks of a firm-year. 
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TABLE 10 
Accrual Anomaly by Institutional Investor Holdings 
 
)9(.
**
18765
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11101
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+
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+−+−+=
ttttt
ttt
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LMVDWCAccIHHighDWCAccIHModerate
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νββββ
βββ
βααα
 
 
 
Non-Held 
N=12,673 
Moderate-IH 
N=31,633 
High-IH 
N=13,679 
Difference: 
High-Held 
Minus 
Non-Held 
 1β  21 ββ +  31 ββ +   
1988-1995 -0.146*** 
(-5.37) 
-0.124*** 
(-5.51) 
-0.109*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.037 
(-1.04) 
1996-2000 -0.279*** 
(-4.78) 
-0.185*** 
(-6.95) 
-0.051 
(-1.05) 
-0.228*** 
(-3.09) 
2001-2008 -0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.020 
(0.98) 
0.020 
(0.73) 
-0.021 
(0.51) 
 
___________________ 
This table reports the results obtained from OLS regressions of size-adjusted returns on scaled decile 
rankings of WCAcc and control variables over different sub-periods. I interact scaled decile rankings of 
WCAcc with Moderate-IH and High-IH indicator variables to examine the possibility that the anomaly 
may differ by institutional investor holding. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. t-
statistics are  reported in parentheses. 
Non-Held is an indicator variable taking value of one for firm-years not held by transient institutional 
investors, zero otherwise. High-IH is an indicator variable taking value of one for the firm-years if at least 
15 percent of shares are held by transient institutions and the firm-year is not in the upper quartile of 
dedicated institution investor holdings distribution. Transient institutions are institutional investors holding 
less than 1 percent of shares of a given firm-year. Dedicated institutions are institutional investors holding 
more than 1 percent of shares of a given firm-year. Moderate-IH is an indicator variable taking value of 
one for held firms which are not classified as High-IH, zero otherwise. See Appendix A for the definitions 
of other variables. 
 
 
 
 
respectively. Untabulated results suggest that the mean excess return is significantly 
lower for Moderate-IH firms than for Non-Held firms. Furthermore, the mean excess 
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return to the accrual strategy is around 5.1 percent and insignificant for High-IH firms 
during the 1996 and 2001 period. I also estimate Model (9) on a year by year basis and 
report the coefficient on the scaled decile accrual rankings for Non-Held and High-IH 
firms in Figure 2. The results reported in Figure 2 show that the accrual strategy does not 
earn significant excess returns for High-IH firm-years after the discovery of the anomaly 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
The Anomaly for Non-Held and High-IH Firms over Time 
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
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0.4
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___________________ 
This figure shows the anomaly for Non-Held firms and High-IH firms over 1988-2008 period. In 
particular, I estimate Model (10) in Table 10, Panel A, year by year and report the opposite of coefficient 
on scaled decile rankings of accruals for Non-Held firms, 1β− , and for High-IH firms, )( 31 ββ +− . 
The coefficient for High-IH is not significant after 1995, except year 1998. 
 
  
49 
except in year 1998.  Overall, I find that institutional investors played a significant role 
in removing accruals mispricing once the anomaly became widely known. 
In Table 11, Panel A, I find that differential relation of future earnings with 
accruals versus cash flows is similar for Non-Held, Moderate-IH, and High-IH firms in 
each sub-period. This suggests that the differences in mean excess returns to the accrual 
strategy are not driven by differences differential persistence of accruals and cash flows 
for Held and Non-Held firms. I also examine whether the smaller returns to Held firms  
 
 
 
TABLE 11 
Alternative Explanations for the Differences in Accrual Anomaly for Held and 
Non-Held Firms 
 
Panel A: Differential Persistence of Accruals and Cash Flows by Institutional 
Investor Holdings over Sub-Periods  
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Non-Held 
(N=12,673) 
Moderate-IH 
(N=31,633) 
High-IH 
(N=13,679) 
Difference: 
High-IH 
Minus 
Non-Held 
Period 1121 γγ −  )( 12112221 γγγγ +−+  )( 13112321 γγγγ +−+   
1988-1995 0.138 
(5.94) 
0.152 
(6.93) 
0.155 
(6.60) 
0.017 
(0.53) 
1996-2000 0.163 
(5.19) 
0.198 
(9.42) 
0.178 
(4.18) 
0.015 
(0.29) 
2001-2008 0.144 
(4.07) 
0.161 
(5.38) 
0.191 
(5.38) 
0.047 
(1.10) 
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TABLE 11 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Analysts’ Accrual Related Bias by Institutional Investor Holdings over 
Sub-Periods 
 
)11(** 1312
112101
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Non-Held: 
(N=6,286) 
Moderate-IH 
(N=16,312) 
High-IH 
(N=11,329) 
Difference: 
High-IH 
Minus 
Non-Held 
Period 11γ  1211 γγ +  1311 γγ +   
1988-1995 -0.108 
(-4.87) 
-0.162 
(-7.44) 
-0.125 
(-6.04) 
-0.017 
(-0.56) 
1996-2000 -0.165 
(-6.05) 
-0.167 
(-8.61) 
-0.119 
(-5.05) 
0.046 
(1.30) 
2001-2008 -0.076 
(-2.67) 
-0.086 
(-5.55) 
-0.125 
(-5.35) 
-0.049 
(-1.35) 
 
___________________ 
Panel A reports the results for the differential persistence of the accruals and cash flows components of 
earnings for gain firms. In particular, I estimate Model (10) and obtain the difference between the 
coefficients on cash flow and accruals component of earnings, the coefficient on cash flows minus the 
coefficient on accruals. The model is estimated in each year separately. Each annual coefficient estimate is 
treated as a single observation and statistical tests of differences are based upon the means and standard 
deviations of the annual observations. The difference column shows whether the difference in coefficients 
on the accruals and cash flow component of earnings is significantly different for High-IH firms and Non-
Held firms.  
Panel B reports the results obtained from OLS regressions of analysts’ forecast error on WCAcc by 
institutional investor holdings over different sub-periods.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm and 
year level. t-statistics are  reported in parentheses. AFerror is obtained by subtracting analysts’ mean 
consensus earnings forecasts from the actual earnings and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
than Non-Held firms could be due to the differences in analysts’ accrual-related bias for 
Held and Non-Held firms. 
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The results, reported in Table 11, Panel B, indicate that analysts’ accrual related 
overoptimism is similar for Non-Held, Moderate-IH, and High-IH firms in each sub-
period. These findings suggest that the differences in analysts’ forecast efficiency with 
respect to accruals cannot explain the differences in the anomaly for Held and Non-Held 
firms. Thus, the smaller returns to the accrual-related strategy for Held firms are 
consistent with arbitrage trading by institutional investors.   
In Table 12, I repeat the analyses for mutual funds and obtain results that are 
similar to those for institutional investors. In particular, I find no significant difference in 
excess returns to Non-Held, moderate mutual holdings (Moderate-MH), and high mutual 
holdings (High-MH) firms in the period prior to discovery of the anomaly. The excess 
returns to Non-Held and Moderate-MH firms are around 28.2 percent and 18.7 percent 
per year during the 1996 and 2001 period, respectively, and the difference is statistically 
significant. The mean excess return to the accrual strategy is around 2.2 percent and 
insignificant for High-MH firms during the 1996 and 2001 period, suggesting that the 
end of the anomaly started earlier for firms held by mutual funds. Additional findings 
suggest that the smaller excess returns to the accrual strategy for High-MH than for Non-
Held firms is not driven by differences in the lower persistence of accruals with respect 
to cash flows. 
In sum, I find that the decline in the anomaly started earlier for held firms than 
for non-held firms. Moreover, there is no significant anomaly among High-Held firms 
after the discovery of the anomaly. However, the anomaly ends for both Held and Non-
Held firms by 2002. Thus, institutional investor holdings and mutual fund holdings alone  
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TABLE 12 
Testing the Difference in the Accrual Anomaly for Firms Held by Mutual Funds 
and Non-Held Firms 
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Non-Held: 
(N=12,464) 
Moderate-MH 
(N=32,908) 
High-MH 
(N=12,613) 
Difference: 
High-Held 
Minus 
Non-Held 
Period 1β  21 ββ +  31 ββ +   
1988-1995 -0.146*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.122*** 
(-6.13) 
-0.107*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.039 
(-0.93) 
1996-2000 -0.282*** 
(-4.80) 
-0.187*** 
(-6.12) 
-0.022 
(-0.42) 
-0.260*** 
(-3.44) 
2001-2008 -0.004 
(-0.13) 
0.012 
(0.59) 
-0.006 
(-0.27) 
-0.003 
(-0.07) 
 
___________________ 
This table reports the results obtained from OLS regressions of size-adjusted returns on scaled decile 
rankings of WCAcc and control variables over different sub-periods. I interact scaled decile rankings of 
WCAcc with Moderate-MH and High-MH indicator variables to examine the possibility that the anomaly 
may differ by mutual fund holding. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. t-statistics are  
reported in parentheses. Non-Held is an indicator variable taking value of one if the firm-year is not held 
by transient institutions or transient funds, zero otherwise. High-MH is an indicator variable taking value 
of one for the firm-years having at least the median number of transient funds and the firm-year is not in 
the upper quartile of dedicated institutional investor holdings distribution. Moderate-MH is an indicator 
variable taking value of one for held firms which are not classified as High-MH, zero otherwise. Transient 
mutual funds are funds holding less than 1 percent of shares of a given firm-year. Dedicated mutual funds 
are funds holding at least 1 percent of shares of a given firm-year. 
 
 
 
 
cannot account for the absence of the anomaly. The results reported in Figure 3 show 
increases in both the percentage of firms held by institutional investors and the 
percentage of those firms’ shares held by institutional investors for firms in the extreme  
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FIGURE 3 
Increase in Sophisticated Investors for Firms in the Extreme Accruals Deciles 
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accruals deciles. There is also substantial increase in the number of institutional 
investors following a particular firm. Moreover, the number of mutual funds following a 
particular firm and percentage of firms held by mutual funds also increase. Green et al. 
(2011) find an increase in investment by hedge funds advised by academic accountants. 
Overall, these findings suggest that an increase in trading to exploit the accrual anomaly 
is likely to explain the absence of the anomaly, consistent with learning. 
4.7. Additional Findings 
Xie (2001) finds that the accrual anomaly is mainly driven by investors’ 
mispricing of discretionary accruals. In untabulated results obtained by using Mishkin 
test, I first confirm Xie’s (2001) finding that discretionary accruals are less persistent 
than total accruals and find that investors overweight the information in discretionary 
accruals and correctly weight the information in non-discretionary accruals during the 
anomaly period.13  During the no-anomaly period, investors correctly weight the 
information in both discretionary and non-discretionally accruals. I also estimate Model 
(9) using discretionary accruals and find the anomaly is similar for Non-Held, Moderate-
IH, and High-IH firms before the discovery of the anomaly, between 1988 and 1995. 
Furthermore, the mean excess return is significantly lower for Moderate-IH firms than 
for Non-Held firms and the mean excess return is around 8.4 percent and marginally 
significant for High-IH firms during the 1996 and 2001 period. During the no-anomaly 
period, I find that the mean excess returns to Moderate-IH and High-IH firms are around 
4.7 percent and 3.1 percent and insignificant, respectively, while the mean excess return 
                                                 
13
 As in Xie (2001), I use the Jones model to estimate the discretionary accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals. 
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is around 9.6 percent and marginally significant for Non-Held firms. Overall, the results 
for non-discretionary accruals are similar to those for total accruals and suggest an 
improvement in investors’ interpretation of discretionary accruals after the discovery of 
the accrual anomaly.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
The accrual anomaly, first documented by Sloan (1996), has been one of the 
most studied topics in accounting research. Because of the simplicity of the accrual-
related investment strategy and the economic significance of returns it generates, prior 
studies has questioned whether the anomaly is real and, if so, why it persisted for years 
after its discovery. Recent evidence suggests that the anomaly eventually disappeared in 
2002 and has been undetectable since then (e.g., Richardson et al. 2010). In this study, I 
examine whether improvements in investors’ understanding of the lower persistence of 
accruals with respect to cash flows, i.e., market learning, explain the absence of the 
anomaly in recent years. The absence of the anomaly requires that at least one of the 
following conditions associated with the presence of the anomaly changed in the no-
anomaly period:  (i) a differential relation between future earnings and cash flows versus 
accruals, (ii) incorrect weighting of cash flows and accruals by investors when predicting 
earnings, leading to forecast errors that are predictable from the level of cash flows and 
accruals, and (iii) association of earnings forecast errors with returns. I find that all of the 
conditions are present in the anomaly period. The differential relation between future 
earnings and cash flows versus accruals persists in the no-anomaly period and there is no 
evidence of a decrease in the association of earnings forecast errors with returns. I find, 
however, that investors correctly incorporated the differential persistence of accruals and 
cash flows when forming predictions of future earnings implicit in beginning-of-year 
security prices. This finding is consistent with Richardson et al.’s (2010) conjecture that 
market learning explains the absence of the anomaly.  
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Analysts are commonly viewed as sophisticated information processors, and I 
investigate whether improvements in their forecasts might have contributed to the 
disappearance of the anomaly.  Prior evidence suggests that analysts’ earnings forecasts 
are optimistically biased for firms with high accruals in the anomaly period, implying 
that analysts are at least partly subject to biases that lead to the anomaly (e.g., Bradshaw 
et al. 2001). I find that the association between analyst optimism and accruals is weaker 
in the no-anomaly period, but is still statistically significant. Furthermore, I find that 
followed and non-followed firms had similar levels of the accrual anomaly in the 
anomaly period and that the anomaly ended simultaneously for both samples. This 
suggests that improvements in analyst forecasts alone cannot account for improved 
market efficiency with respect to accruals. 
This study provides insights on the factors contributing to the accrual anomaly 
and its apparent correction in recent years.  My study also sheds light on analysts’ role in 
market inefficiency with respect to accruals. Green et al. (2011) argue that the absence 
of the anomaly is driven by greater investments in the accrual strategy by large hedge 
funds advised by academic accountants, consistent with learning. Mohanram (2009) 
finds, however, that trading volume increases for firms with both moderate and extreme 
accruals, and that this increase is driven by a large number of small trades rather than the 
large trades typical of hedge funds.  He argues that increases in the number of analysts’ 
cash flow forecasts explain the recent absence of the anomaly. The findings in this study 
suggest that the absence of the anomaly is not restricted to followed firms, and are 
inconsistent with the argument that analysts’ cash flow forecasts are responsible for 
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market learning and the absence of the anomaly. Instead, the results suggest that learning 
by investors is independent of analysts. I find that the anomaly was significantly lower 
for firms held by institutional investors than for firms with no institutional investor 
holdings once the anomaly became widely known, while accrual-related returns were 
similar for the two groups before the discovery of the anomaly.  I also find that both the 
percentage of firms held by institutional investors and the percentage of those firms’ 
shares held by institutional investors increased in the no-anomaly period. These findings 
are consistent with Green et al. (2011) and suggest that an increase in trading to exploit 
the accrual anomaly is likely to explain the absence of the anomaly.  
Prior studies use analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for market expectations 
and view the inefficiencies in analysts’ forecasts as evidence of market wide inefficiency 
(e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2001; Bradshaw et al. 2006). Richardson et al. (2010) further 
suggest that documenting an association between analyst forecast errors and a given 
value-relevant information item provides a reasonable presumption that the market is 
also inefficient with respect to that information.  The findings in this study indicate, 
however, that investors are not influenced by the remaining accrual-related 
overoptimism in analysts’ forecasts during the no-anomaly period. These results suggest 
that market expectations may significantly diverge from analysts’ consensus forecasts. In 
future research, I will examine the implications of this divergence for the common 
practice of using analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for market expectations.  
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APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Market to Book:  Market value to book value of common. I exclude negative book value 
observations when obtaining Market to Book ratio. 
 
EARN: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, scaled by average 
assets (AT). 
 
WCAcc: Working-capital accruals, calculated as the sum of (appropriately signed) 
changes in working capital accounts from the statement of cash flows (RECCH, INVCH, 
APALCH, TXACH, AOLOCH), scaled by average assets (AT). Missing values for 
APALCH, TXACH, and AOLOCH are set to zero.  
 
WCCF: An estimate of cash flows attributable to recurring operations, calculated as the 
difference between EARN and WCAcc, scaled by average assets (AT). 
 
ARET:  the annual size adjusted buy-and-hold return. The accumulation period begins 
four months after the firm’s fiscal year-end. The size-adjusted returns are calculated by 
deducting a firm’s size-matched portfolio buy-and-hold return from its raw buy-and-hold 
return, where size portfolios are obtained from CRSP and are based on size deciles of 
NYSE and AMEX firms.   
 
Loss: Indicator variable taking value of one if the firm incurred loss in prior year, zero 
otherwise 
 
AnalystForecast: Analysts’ mean consensus forecast, measured by the average of the 
most recent forecast by each analyst following the firm-year within the 60 days ending 
one day before the portfolio formation date. Analysts’ earnings per share forecasts are 
adjusted for stock splits, multiplied by outstanding shares, and scaled by average total 
assets. 
 
EarnIBES: Actual earnings obtained from IBES. IBES actual earnings per share are 
adjusted for stock splits, multiplied by outstanding shares, and scaled by average total 
assets. 
 
AFerror: Analysts’ mean consensus forecast error, measured by subtracting EarnIBES 
from analysts’ mean consensus forecast, AnalystForecast. 
 
Follow: Indicator variable taking value of one for firm-years having at least one analyst 
forecast prior to the portfolio formation date. 
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Instown: Percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
 
InstownHeld: Indicator variable taking value of one if the firm has institutional investor 
holdings, and zero otherwise. 
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